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In tIimo oj tM long .mu oj AUi~ deJeau IlUJJered. in Norway, rwrthun Franu,
Greeu, Ma14ya, tM Philippinu, and Burrrw, the political olueroer 1uu had to ruk
MrMelJ again and again what hope could have ind'uced the Anglo.America"" to con-
tinue the war. The la8t Jew month. hatle .upplied the an6WlIT to thi, quution: it is tM
Jwp. Jor mperiorUy i'n ,~umlHlro9--number. oj 11WI a,ld material. Since the autumn
oj 1942. the Alliu have erniwoored. to fight boUlu only in p14cu wlure tJa~ have had
o-oenchelming 1I1tmlHlr. oj troop6 and umlamenu 011 Uieir lick, ai, Jor i1l6tarlCe, ill
North AJrica, Guadalcanar. Attll, and Sicily.
lfe do not interni to examine hMe whether the Anglo.America"" actually po6'u,
a urfJOler cmnamml capacity or more able-bodiul men than the AN. IN/tead, we
.hall rai.e Uie quution: Dou a fWeponduance in men and weapoM oJJer any
jU6tijicolion whatwer Jor the hope oj final victory, dou t/~ god oj war nallll Ja1lOT
the 14rger baualiorwf
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NEXT to George Washington, Abra-ham Lincoln is the best-knownfigure in the history of the United
States, For the Roosevelt era before the
outbreak of the present war it can perhaps
even be said that Lincoln held first place
in the esteem of the American people.
His sayings were often quoted, for in-
stance his famous words "government of
the people. by the people, for the people"
(quoted the more often. the less America,n
reality corresponded to this ideal), or his
pronouncement:
"I agree with you in Providence; but
I believe in the providence of the most
men, the largest purse, and the largest
cannon."
This pun, with its linking of Providence
with numbers of men, wealth, and arma-
ments. could really stand as a motto for
the America of 1943.
But let us be just and admit that
Lincoln was not the first to put his trust
in large numbers into words. "I have
always noticed that God is on the side
of the heavy battalions," declared a
French statesman, Marquis de Ill. Ferte-
Imbault, to Queen Anne of France. In
1677 the Count de Bussy wrote in a
letter: "God is generally for the big
squadrons against the little ones." And
about a hundred years Jater, Voltaire
formulated the same idea with the words:
"They say that God is always on the
side of the heavy battalions."
To be sure, there have been many
cases in history where the greater bat-
talions defeated the smaller ones. The
most important example, still fresh in
all our memories, was the strangulation
of Germany in the Great War, when
almost the entire world had united
against her and she herself was weak-
ened from within by the influence of
materialistic ideas. But there have also
been countless cases in which the opposite
was true. ~tory has seen decisive wars
and battles which were won by the smaller
battalions.
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE
PERSIAN EMPmE
Up to the sixth century B.C., the
western part of Eurasia had been ruled
by three great empires: Egypt, A88yria,
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and Babylon. Suddenly, within a period
of twenty-one years (546 to 525 B.C.),
these states were swept off the map of
t,he world and replaced by the Persian-
Median Empire. The Persians and t,he
Medes, two Indo-European tribes hardly
known in history till then and overshad-
owed by the splendor of the empires in
the valley of the Nile and in Mesopotamia,
established under Cyrus the Great and his
son one of the largest empires of all time,
reaching hom the Danube to bevond the
lndus. w
Only at the outermost rim of their
dominion did a small state-no, even
worse, It little conglomeration of tiny
city-stutes-dare to oppose and provoke
the mighty Persian Empire by wnnton
incursions, until the "King of Kings"
decided to subject it once and for all.
In 490 B.C. he sent out a grcat army
against Greece which crossed the Aegean
Selt. in many ships. Part of this army
landed 011 the coastal plain of Marathon.
Even if all of Greece had moved against
t.he Persians, she still would only have
b&d the resources of a single one of the
twenty satrapies into which the Persian
Empire was divided. However, the Greek
army that opposed the Persians at Mara-
thon did not even represent all of Greece
hut only two of the city-states, Athens
Rnd Plat-aea. Yet it gained a glorious
victory and threw the Persian landing
eorps back int,o the :;ea.
The subsequent encounters between
Ureek~ and Persians wcre fought in the
,.:pirit of Marathon. At the pass of
Thermopylae, Leonidas fought with a
thousa.ncl men against the whole Persian
army, consisting of tens of thousands of
men, and at Salamis the Greeks defeated
a Persian fleet at least twice as strong as
their own.
How are these victories of the smaller
battalions to be explained, this strange
paradox-first the conquest of a huge
empire by two young tribes, and then
t,he defeat of this empire's forces by the
army of two small Greek cities? We shall
attempt an explanation later on in this
article.
ALEXANDER AND TIIE ROMANS
With these victories against the vast
Persian Empire, the Greeks had not only
maintained their own national freedor~:
they had brought about a decision affect-
ing the entire history of the world. To
the west of Greece there was at that time
nothing that could have resisted an ex-
pansion of the Persian Empire. A vic-
tory over the Greeks would have turned
the Mediterranean into a Persian lake
and given the development of thc Oc-
cident a different turn.
This defensi\7e victory of t,he Greek
minority was even surpassed by the
achievements contained in the aggressive
victory of Alexander the Great against
the Persian Empire a century and a half
later. In the spring of 3:34 B.C. the
barely twenty-year-old king crossed the
Hellespont with 32,000 men on foot nUll
5,000 horsemen to invade the Persian
Empire, which commanded hundreds of
thousands of warriors. With his small
host Alexander won the decisive victories
of 1880s (333) and Gaugamela (331 B.C.).
At Gaugamela he was faced by an army
perhaps twenty times the size of his own
which, moreover, was equipped with such
unusual weapons as scythed war chariot",
and Indian elephants. The superiority
was so great that Alexander's amI\',
although he had drawn it out as far its
possible, extended with its right wing no
further than the center of the Persian host.
A few years after Alexander had
broken into the Persian Empire, he wa~
the ullcontested master of au empi re
that was larger even than the old Persia I I
one. How was this possible! We shall
return to this question later.
While the Alexandrian Empire arose
within a few years through the genim: of
one man, the Roman Empire was the
product of centuries of stea,dy growth and
of the genius of a whole people. But in
one point the early history of both
empires \Va,g similar: both were formed in
the fa,ce of vastly superior enemies.
Starting as a small, w1important settle-
ment whose territory was less fertile than
that of other places of the same region'
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Rome step by step gained hegemony
first over Latium, then over the Apennine
Peninsula, then over the western and
later eastern Mediterranean, and finally
over the entire Occident.
PHARSALOS A....~D ACTIm\I
The long list of battles fought by the
H,oman armies on the hard road to power
contains hardly auything that is equal in
brilliance to the campaiglls of Alexander
the Ureat. Besides victories there were
also LUnny defeats. It is only due to a
~tubbornness and single-mindedness
unique in history tha.t this road led
finally to the supremacy of Rome over
the western world.
Even while the Roman Empire was
till being formed, grave conflicts arose
within the empire over the question of
leaden~hip. The two decisive battles in
this struggle were both won by the
smaller batta,lions. At Pharsalos (48 B.C.)
PomJX'y had about twice a.s many foot
t;oldier~ 11' Caesar and seven times as
mallV horsemen. But Caesar won the
battie and became the sale ruler of the
mpire. Phar alos meant the end of the
Roman Republic and the beginning of
the monarohv and thus represents one
of the decisive events in the history of
the Occident. Under Caesar's successor,
Octavian, the struggle for sole domination
was resumed. With a. fleet inferior in
numbers as well as in the size of its units,
Octavian vanquished the power of An-
tony and Cleopatra. at Actium (31 B.C.).
This victory enabled him, who was soon
to be known as Augustus, to establish a
type of monarchy in Rome which was
to survive for centuries.
TWO mSTORIC DECISIONS
In the days of Augustus, Rome was a.t
the peak of her power. She knew no
rivals in the Occident, and her battle-
scarred, excellently armed legions ex-
tended the borders of the empire from
decade to decade ever further into formerly
unknown regions. Yet a battle took
place in those years by which a people
~tanding at the very beginning of its
development and split up into many
tribes dealt a heavy blow to the onr-
whelming power of Rome. In 9 A.D. the
army of Quintilius Va,rus was annihilated
in the Tcutoburg Forest by Germanic
warriors under Arminius the CheruscaJl.
This event prevented the Romanization
of the territories on the right bank of
the Rhine. In contrast to the Gauls.
who had quickly become Roman after tho
campaigns of Caesar, the Gennanic tribes
were thus able to develop on their own
and to assemble the forces \vhioh were
one day to lend to the fall of the Roman
Empire.
During the migration of peoples the
Huns invaded Europe with hugo armies
and roamed throughout its lands without
encountering much resistance. Only when
they advanced further to the west, deep
into France, were Attila's hundreds of
thousands of men opposed by an anny
composed of Visigoths and Romans (451
A.D.). The battle, whioh has been named
after the Catalaunia.n Fields, was fought
with suoh terrible fierceness that, accord-
ing to legend, even the fallen warrior~
continued to fight on as Rpi.rit~. The
wave of Hun supremaoy ,vas /Jot onl.v
stopped but even forced to reoede, and the
vict<>ry ngainst AtWa contributed de-
cisively toward saving Europe from the
fate later suffered by Central Asia. and
Russia nnder the Mongols.
ORESCENT AND OROSS
Barely two hundred years later, one of
the most amazing developments in history
took place: the asoent of Islam. In 1\11
unequaled maroh of victory the armie.'l
of the sparse, uncivilized population of
the ~Iilabian desert established a vast
empire which ha.s left its stamp on many
regions to this very day. The founda-
tions of the Mohammedan em pim were
laid within the ten years after the death
of the Prophet in numerous battles in
which the Arabs were always in the
minority. In an incredibly short time
the banner of the Prophet was carried
across the whole of the Near East far
into Central Asia" and later to the Pyr-
enees as well as the East Jndilln archi-
pelago.
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The counterblow against the rise of
Islam came with the Crusades. In a pre-
vious article (July 1942) we related how
the Ch.ristian expewtionary armies, mov-
ing against huge odds and thousands of
kilometers away from home, invaded the
richly populated, strong Mohammedan
empire and, even after grave privations,
were victorious against fresh and far
superior armies, as, for example, in the
Battle of the Holy Lance at the gates of
Antioch in 1098, which opened the road
into the Holy Land for the first Crusaders.
Gfu....GHIS KHAN A..o.. ..D JOAN OF ARC
The next world power arose one cen-
tury later from very modest beginnings,
when the conqueror who was later to be
known as Genghis Khan united several
small Mongol tribes under himself. The
Mongol storm broke when Genghis Khan
led his warriors against the Chin Empire
in 1211. In spite of the fact that this
empire was far superior to his hordes in
every respect-its civilization, its number
of people, and the size of its walled
cities-he weakened it to such a degree
that he could take up his unique vic-
torious campaign against the West. Here
the Mongols were in the minority in most
of the battles they fought. Among their
enemies were many warlike tribes, such
as the Turks of Central Asia, who were
superior to them in numbers. And yet
the Mongols were victorious again and
again. Their horses carried them far
into Russia and the Near East. And the
result of these battles was the greatest
empire that ever existed in Eurasia.
Among the longest and most bitterly
fought wars in the history of Europe
were the meclieval conflicts between the
French and the English. As a result of
dynastic heritage, the English kings had
at that time large possessions on French
soil. This fact led to an almost endless
series of wars which culminated in what
is known as the Hundred Years' War
(1337 to 1453). For a long time the
English were victorious, and at the begin-
ning of the fifteenth century France lay
prostrate, almost defenseless. In 1422
an English king was proclaimed King of
France, while the French dauphin was
a weakling. Large parts of France were
occupied by the English. The English
ruled in Paris. They laid siege to Orleans,
the gateway to southern France, and the
city was preparing to surrender. Then
suddenly a peasant girl, called Joan,
declared that she had been sent by
Heaven to save France. She fought her
way into besieged Orleans. Out of un-
patriotic cowards she created an army
with. a fanatic will for victory, an army
instilled with ten times its ordinary
power and courage. Against English
superiority she led this small French
army from victory to victory. And
although she was later taken prisoner and
burned at the stake by the English, her
spirit continued to animate the French
army. The English were driven from
the European Continent, only Calais re-
maining in their hands for some time.
A development of historic importance
had been concluded.
CONQUERING THE WORLD
During the next few decades the world
experienced a wealth of important events
when, in an explosive expansion, the
Portuguese and the Spanish created enor-
mous empires with the smallest battal-
ions in history. Accustomed to the idea
of armies of millions, we can scarcely
conceive today how tiny in numbers the
forces were with which those momentous
decisions were brought about. With but
a few ships, the Portuguese gained the
victories of Diu (1509) and Malacca (1511)
against vastly superior forces and seized
control over the Inwan Ocean, thus
opening the gates to the riches of the
East Inwan archipelago. Thousands of
miles from home-which at that time
could only be reached by the immense
detour around Africa-they sailed from
victory to victory and turned the ocean
from Morocco to the Moluccas into a
Portuguese lake.
A few years later the Spaniards suc-
ceeded in similar achievements in the
Americas. In August 1519, Hernando
Cortes, leading a small force of 400 men
on foot, 15 horsemen, and 7 small cannODS,
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started out from the coast of the Gulf of
Mexico to conquer the Aztec Empire, then
one of the most advanced states of the
world, which had a population of perhaps
five million inhabitants. In order fully
to appreciate the boldness of this venture,
one must bear in mind that Cortes began
his campaign with no knowledge whatever
of the country, its inhabitants, and their
languages. On the way to Mexico he
first defeated the state of Tlaxcala. with
its haU a million inhabitants and tens of
thousands of warriors. Then he con-
quered Mexico.
One might object that he succeeded in
this more by cwming and brutality than
by military achievements. However, he
had enough opportunity also to prove
the military ability of his small force.
In July 1520 he was forced to retreat
from the city of Mexico and to give battle
at Otumba. Here his few hundred
Spaniards, assisted by some native allies,
fought a.ga.inst the combined armies of
the Aztec Empire, which numbered tens
of thousands. In this battle Cortes no
longer had any cannons, not even muskets;
many of his men were sick and exhausted
by fatigue and hardship. Yet the victory
was his, and soon afterwards he was the
undisputed ruler of the empire.
Just as fantastic were the a<h-entures
of Pizarro who, in 1531, set alit with an
e\'en ~maUer band-I02 men on foot and
62 horsemen-to conquer Peru, then
inhabited by six to eight million people.
Here, too, the first successes were more
of a political than a military nature.
But here, too, the conquerors wcre not
spared from battle. In 1535 almost the
entire country rose against them. For
five months a band of at most 200
Spll.niards fought in Cuzco against the
mobilized power of the Inca Empire.
In writing of 200,000 Inca soldiers, the
Spanish chroniclers were probably exag-
gerating. But, even if there were only
20,000, this meant that there were 100
enemies to every Spaniard. In spite of
this, the Spaniards won, and transformed
the empire of the Incas into a Spanish
oolony.
ONE AGAINST EUROPE
One of the most important develop-
ments in the modern history of Europe was
the rise of Prussia, under whose leadership
the German Empire was later to be
~ P.., t Of S.t.'\. "tdto.~ Or"".,,, ti l ,.,-
~",) ¥'ll '>-< S·.•,.", ""or.
<l} C~.:.\ lJl'~d tl) Pr- ..Hld·n 17~t.
e (04''/ .011 19"."~t Pr-vS\lO' ~.., 171)6
e NNtrdl (Ountr••\
Central Europe in th6 days of Fred6rick the Great
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formcd frolll the combineu German states.
:Pruf;sil~ is largely the work of the House
of Hohenzollern, and it represented the
cro""niu of many wars /Lud of centuries
of effort ou the part of this dynasty
when little Brandenburg became Pru sm.
One igniticant stage on this road was
the victot,y gained b.v the Great Elector
of BmmlenlllU'g in 1U75 at Fehrbellin
when, with 6,000 l~rus ians and 12 can-
nOIlS, he defeated l~,OOO Swedes with 38
cannons. By means of thi victory over
~wedon. which till then had been regarded
a the foremost military nation of Europe,
Prustlia. l1(lvanced from an indifferent little
statc to a largerstate worth reckoning with.
Even more important was the reign of
Frederick the Great and his Seven Years'
War (175G-1763). The Austria of the
Hapsburgs, which observed the rise of
Prussia with deadly jealousy, organized
a powerful coalit,ioll againRt Prussia with
thc express aim of the "tot.al destructioll
of Prussia." The greater part of Europe
had combined in this coalition, and
among it. members were Austria, Uu ia,
Fran e, weden, :saxony, Bavaria, 'Yiirt-
temherg and a number of smaller states.
l'rusRiu., Oil the other hand, with its
haTc!y ~t million inlul.bitants, stood alone.
HUlIl)vcr, which had at first allied itself
to l'russia, withdrew again early in the
war; llnd England supported Pru i~
I)nly with money. Year after year Freder-
ick fought against these overwhelming
odos. He gained a number of great vic-
tories, especially at Rossbach with 20,000
Illen against 50,000 Frenchmen and at
Leuthcn with 33,000 men against 60,000
.-\ustrians; and he a1 a ufJered many a
hitter defeat. In the end, however, h~ e·
mergeu vietorious from this unequal strug-
gle. Prussia had become a. European power.
RECE.NT EXAMPLES
.\ few years after the death of Frederick
the Great., this same Prussia failed miser-
ably. In the struggle against the French
Revolution, Prussia, England, Holland,
:-;paiu, and several smaller states had
united in 1792 in a coalition of anti-
revolutionary powcrs. This coalition ,'ms
va.stly superior to Francc, not only be-
cause all Elu'opean powers except Rus!'i<1.
belonged to it, but also because Fram'e
herself was torn by civil war and hardly
possessed any army at all after thousand
of her aristocratic officers had left the
country and joined the coalition. The
mob which represented the rC"olutionary
army was at first so useless that it rllli
away in panic from every clash with the
coalition troops, even when it was supe-
rior in numbers, as at Tournay, where
4,000 Frenchmen fled from a small
Austrian detachment. The }?rench for-
tresses of Longwy and Verdun capitulated,
almost without tighting, to the coalition
army. But then came a sudden turn.
After the Cannonade of Valmy in Sep·
tember 1792 the situation was reyersed:
the re\'olutionary armies not unly drove
the armies of the coalition out of Fmncc
but even followed them deep into their
own territory.
To give a finll,1 example of most recent
times, we need only think of the R\ll"~()'
Japanese War of 1904·1905. Toclny we
are accustomed to regard Japan as a
leading power. At that time, however,
she was still in the early stages of her
modem development. .At the outbreak
. of the Russo-Japanese \Yal', only fifty
years had passed sinee the opening of
Japan; only forty years since an English/
American/Dutch/French fleet had bom-
barded Japan, alma t without resistance,
and had even been paid an indemnity for
that; only thirty-three yea.rs !'lince the
feudal system had been abolished. And
this Japan, that seemed hardl.v to have
outgrown the :Middle Ages, took lip the
struggle nga.in t one of the large. t powers
of that time, against a countr.,· that
possessed almost inexhaustible reserves
of man power and resow'ces as well as a
great military tl'l1dition. After a series
of gloriou victories, Japan q uickl'y
forced the empire of the Tsars to make
peace.
IT TAKES LF_o\DERS
How were all these victories of the
sma.ll battnlions against the large ones
possible? The answer cnnnot he formu-
lated in one sentence. It consists of
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many reasons, of which we shall present
it few. They are to be sought partly in
the nature of the leadership and pa,rtly
in the nature of t,he peoples and armies
'0 led.
One prereqnisite for the yictory of the
:;maLler battalions is the genius of their
leaders. A true leader needs fur more
than just the knowledge of military
theories and pra,ctice; he has the courage
to rely upon himself and to take the
responsibility for his own decisions.
JIiltiades risked. the battle of Marathon
without wa.iting for the arrival of the
'partan army nnd without sha.ring with
other lea.ders the responsibility for the
decision to fight. A leader is so Ull-
hakeably convinced of his own supe-
riority and that of his Illen that, even in
the face of vast odds and the ab ence of
any aid, he does not he itate to strike at
the enemy as Cortes and Pizarro did or
I'rederick the Great at the beginuing of
the even Years' War. This feeling of
uperi rity grow from the leader's fa.ith
in hi mis ion from his belief that he
repre ent, the "wave of the future." It
<lUdow him with forces that, as in the
case of Joan of Are, border on the super-
natural. It is these forces which in
apparently hopele 'itnations do not
allow him to lose courage, while his
opponents, who do not possess such
faith, are inclined to lose their head ,
Like Pompey who, although an experi-
en'ced and viotorious commander, turned
to Hight even before the battle was ended,
or like Cleopatra and Antony who,
thinking mainly of themselves, abandoned
the main body of their forces in the midst
of battle to eek safety in flight.
'Ihis faith in his mission often also
raises the leader morally over his enemies.
In Actium the nobler man defeated the
inferior one; and Joan of Arc fought not
only against the English army but also
against the lack of morals among her own
troops by proclaiming her struggle to he
a pure and holy wa·l'. The true leader
sets an example to his troops. He con-
vinces his soldiers that their le-ader and
they belong together. Alexander t,he
reat was the first soldier of his army
who 'hared with it all the danger~ of
battle and hardships of lIlarching, while
his opponent Darius had chiefly himself
to blame for his defeats, as he was always
the first to turn his chariot iu flight.
_-\nd how close Frederiok the Great was
to the hearts of his soldiers is proved by
the countless anecdotes about his pcr-
sOLlnl feats in victory and defeat.
SO:\JE UF THEm QUALITIES
One requirement of a successful leauer
is the faculty to discern every possibility
offering it.<3elf and immediately to exploit
it to his OW11 <Ldvantage. ~iiltiades Illude
the most skillful use of the topogmphy of
the coastal plain of Marathon in plan-
ning his battle. On the battlefield of
Caugamcla, Alexnnder perceived that a
gap had formed between the center alld
the left wing of the Persian army, and
by quickly throwing a spearhead of hi.
troops into this gap he !'plit up the
enemv's front and thus brought about
his own victory. At the beginlling of t.he
battle of Phursalos. Caesar noticed tha 1.
Pompey was massing hi!' ~uperior ca.,'nl!',."
at the left wing in order to execute hiS
decisive thrust with it. Thi:-; gan Cnc:::ar
a chance to prepare countermeasure
which frustrated Pompey's plan and
turned it into a defeat. When the small
Spanish band at Otumba, bleeding from
many wounds, could hardly defend itself
any longer against the hundredfold supe-
riority of its enemies, Cortes suddcllly
recognized the commander ill chief of the
Aztec army some distance a,\\'a~·. Corte,.;,
accompanied by a few trust~1 men. fuught.
his wa,y through to the Aztec chief and
killed him, thereby gi\-ing the battk lL
new turn.
In order to bc able to bea t his oppo-
nent, the leader l'nllst be ahle to guess
the thoughts of hi foe, )liltiades, whu
had previously participa.ted in a Persiall
campaign in the Ba.lkans, knew that the
strength of the Persian army was the
deadly hail of arrows released by its
archers. In order to reduce the time
during which the Grceks could ue shot
at from a distance with Persian arrow:;,
)liltiades made the bold decision to lead
hi.. excellently trained men, in spite of
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their heavy armor, to the enemy ranks
at a run. Arminius the Cheruscau had
also served in the army of his enemies
and was acquainted with the Roman
legions' style of fighting. He could not
hope to defeat the Romans with his in-
experienced troops in an open battle.
Consequently, he laid his plans in such a
way that the battle took place in a forest
area full of ravines that was unfavorable
to the Romans.
LUCK
Finally, the successful leader requires
that indefinable something that we call
"luck." Had Cortes not seen the enemy
commander in chief in the midst of the
battle's tumult, probably not a single
Spaniard would have left the battlefield
of Otumba alive. Luck played an espe-
cially striking role in the case of Frederick
the Great. Toward the end of the Seven
Years' War his cause looked very bad.
Large parts of his small country were
occupied by the enemy, who had tem-
porarily even been in the capital. His
only support outside of Prusaia the
English statesman Pitt, had to ~ign
from the cabinet; this opened the way to
the separate peace which England, con-
trary to her agreement with Frederick,
concluded soon after with France.
~ederick could have ma.de peace under
mglorious conditions. But, although
there was no one in Europe who still
conceded him a chance, he continued to
fight, and suddenly luck came to his aid.
T~arinaElizabeth, who hated him bitterly,
died and was replaced on the Russian
throne by Peter III, .an ardent admirer
of Frederick. Peter immediately con-
cluded a separate peace with Prussia and
in addition to that, declared himself and
his army to be allied to Frederick. Al-
though he was murdered soon after, he
had been on the throne long enough to
have caused a complete reversal in the
military position and to provide Frederick
with the breathing space he needed for
the victorious conclusion of the war.
THE SpmIT OF THE FOLLOWERS. • •
Lik~ the leader, so also must his people
and his army be convinced of the neces-
sity of the struggle and of victory,
determined to maintain or fight for their
freedom. They must be prepared to
make every sacrifice needed and be filled
with glowing patriotism and the clear
knowledge as to the consequences of a
defeat. And finally, they must be con-
vinced that they are fighting for a good
cause and that right is on their side.
At Marathon, the Athenians were filled
by a spirit which their great poet Aeschy-
lus, who had participated in the battle,
later put into the following words:
o sons of the Greeks! Fight for the freedom
of. your country! Fight for the freedom of your
children and of your wives-for the shrines o£
y.our fathers' gods, and for t.he sepulchers of your
sires. All-aU are now staked upon the strife.
In the same way, the Germanic tribes
in the Teutoburg Forest and on the
Catalaunian Fields, and the Japanese at
Port Arthur and at Tsushima, were filled
wit~ the sense that the fate not only of
therr people but of every single one of
them depended on the outcome of the
battle. On the other hand, the Persian
army, composed as it was of dozens of
subjected tribes, lacked this sense. What
did it concern these tribes whether the
Persian king won new laurels on the far
shores of Greece or not? Hence the only
troops in the Persian army who really
fought at Marathon and on the other
Greek battlefields were the Persians, in
the narrow seUBe of this word. It wa.s
impossible in the Russo-Japanese War
for the Russian peasant to take a personal
interest in the outcome of a war to which
he had to be transported thousands of
kilometers and in which he was supposed
to fight for territories, whose names meant
nothing to him, against a people he did
not even know. The same Prussians
who, under Frederick, had amazed the
world with their achievements, failed a
few years later when, without a leading
idea of their own, they clashed with
troops fired with the ideas of a great
revolution.
In some cases the determination of the
smaller battalions was born out of the
courage of their despair. The Spaniards
at Otumba and in Cuzco knew, like the
Prusaians under Frederick, that there
THE SMALLER BATTALIONS 89
were only two alternatives: victory or
complete annihilation. And when reli-
gious fanaticism is added-as in the case
of the hosts of Islam or the Crusades or
Joan of Arc-or a burning feeling of
revenge, as that felt by Arminius's men
against Varus for his infamous deeds, or
by the Visigoths on the Catalaunian Fields
when they saw their king Theoderic fall,
then even a superiority in numbers can-
not save the enemy from defeat.
••.AND THEm QUALITY
Very often in history the strength of
the small battalions was to be found in
the health and simplicity of their youth-
ful power and in the softness of their
opponents. The Greek historian Herod-
otus explains the victories of the Medes
and Persians by many examples showing
the contrast between the tough virility
of these conquerors and the degeneration
of their foes. Later the Persians them-
selves fell victim to this degeneration, and
in the speech addressed by Alexander to
his troops before the battle of Issos he
could justly speak of Greek strength
being pitted against Persian degeneration.
This stern simplicity was also the secret
of the astonishing superiority of the
Mongols over their enemies who, in
cultural and many other respects, were
much further advanced. Under Genghis
Khan's leadership, the Mongols lived their
whole lives in and for battle and sub-
ordinated everything to the one goal:
victory.
Often it was new methods of war or
new weapons which gave victory to the
smaller battalions. The archers of the
Persian army contributed much toward
the establishment of the great Persian
Empire by employing their weapons in
such a novel and skillful manner that the
enemy had no chance to get close to
them. It was only the armored Greek
athletes in their close and deeply ranked
phalanxes, which they drove like spears
into the ranks of their foes, who put an
end to tllis superiority. The muskets,
cannons, and horses of the Spaniards pro-
vided them with weapons unequaled by
anything the natives of America could
produce. And while the Spaniards had
developed the art of war into a science
-which, for instance, stipulated that at
all times only part of the soldiers should
shoot while the rest should use this
time to reload their guns so that no
pause should occur-their enemies fought
without any plan or system whatever,
simply trying to crush Lhe Spaniards with
their masses. The importance of quality
and battle experience in every single
man was revealed by Caesar's veterans
at Pharsalos, when they fought against
opponents superior in numbers but in-
ferior in quality.
Discipline has always been an essential
factor on the side of victorious armies.
The lack of discipline on the part of the
Persian troops, who looted Alexander's
camp during the battle of Gaugamela,
contributed toward their defeat. On the
other hand, the armies of the Mongols
had been trained by Genghis Khan to
iron obedience. In their battles we rarely
hear of outstanding individual deeds but
always of the excellent achievements of
the army as a whole. Disoipline increases
in effectiveness the more it originates
from the voluntary willingness of each
man to subordinate himself to the whole,
while it loses its value the more it is a
product of mere drill or fear of punish-
ment. This was shown by the wars of
the French Revolution, in which undis-
ciplined troops who were filled with faith
in their cause were victorious over the
disciplined but personally uninterested
troops of the reactionary powers.
THE ENEMY'S WEAKNESS
The inner strength of the smaller
battalions very often corresponded to the
inner weakness of the larger ones. How
often has it not happened in history that
a state that was already ripe for decline
was defeated by a young, determined
opponent inferior in numbers1 The tiny
band of Spanish adventurers which, with
Cortes, invaded the empire of the Aztecs,
would, in spite of all superiority of the
individual, have easily been destroyed if
that emp;re had been sound and vital.
But this dtate was populated, beside a.
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Syria against the population enslaved
there for centuries could also be nsed
against the free Germanic tribes. He
fa.iled to see that he was thus digging his
own grave, and he was so blind that he
did not recognize the transparent ruse
with which Arminius lured him and his
legions into the Teutoburg Forest.
In the case of Montezuma it was a.
blindness born of bigotry which con-
tributed toward his downfall. He suc-
cumbed to So religious legend according to
which the benevolent god Quetzatcoat.l
had once left Mexico in the d.irection of
the rising sun with the promise to return
one day. As this god was, according to
Mexican tradition, of tall stature with a
white skin and a heavy beard, Montezuma
was inclined to see the returning god in
Cortes, and this superstition robbed him
of his power of decision and clarity of
action.
campa,ratively small llwnber of ruling
Aztecs, by a large majority of subjected
peoples who, at the very time when
Cortes a,ppeared on the horizon, showed
tL growing restlessness toward the Aztecs.
One of the main rea~ons for this restless-
ness was that the bloody human sacrifices
demanded by the Aztec religion were
assuming larger and larger proportions
and swallowing up tens of thousands of
lives cvery year. The Aztec ruler Monte-
Zluna, who had commenced his reign as
a wise prince, lost himself more and more
in luxury and bigotry. The necessa,ry
funds and human sacrifices had to be
provided by the surrounding peoples.
At the time of the wa,r against Japan,
the Russian state, too, had become in-
wardly rotten. 'l'his was shown by the
revolution of 1905, the curtain raiser to
the gory collapse of the centuries-old
empire of the Tsars twelve years later.
BLINDED BY THE GODS
* *
"
The saying that the gods strike those
with blindness whom they wish to de-
stroy can frequently be applied to the
rulers of states doomed to decline. The
stupid mistakes which Darius constantly
repeated in his war against Alexander
the Great, and his habit of following
incapable counsellors and shutting his
cars to the capable ones, played into the
hands of the Macedonian conqueror.
Varus believed in his arrogance that the
methods he had used as the governor of
So we see that the victories of the
smaller battalions were not coincidences
or freaks of history. They always occur
when certain conditions, some of which
we discussed here, are present. A study
of history shows that, in the great con-
flicts between peoples, it is not wealth
or numbers which are the deciding factor
but the spirit animating the peoples; for
the god of war does not count the men,
he weighs their hearts.
